Intellectual property rights systems are important policy instruments in the armoury of governments. They have the potential to have favourable or adverse consequences for the relevant national system of innovation, technology transfer, research and development and eventually economic growth. While there is a substantial debate related to the optimization of patent systems in the developed world, there is limited debate related to the approaches used in developing countries like South Africa. This article presents an effort to assess whether the South African non-examining patent system makes a contribution or it is detrimental to the country's development. We find that the current intellectual property rights regime not only does not support the objectives of the national innovation system but it facilitates exploitation by foreign interests and creates substantial social costs.
INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property rights (IPRs) refer to rights conferred by governments for the creations of the mind, both artistic and commercial.
Industrial intellectual property rights are protected by patents, registered trademarks, registered industrial designs and integrated circuits and geographical indications ('appellations').
Amongst the protective mechanisms, patents occupy a pre-eminent position. The complexity in their modus operandi and the high stakes surrounding their ownership in knowledge intensive economies made them the primary vehicle of attention and debate internationally.
Starting in the early 1980s the United States, through its "Special 301 Trade Law", directs the US Trade Representative to investigate foreign protection of US intellectual property holders, negotiate higher IP standards, and retaliate with trade sanctions if these negotiations fail.
In response to the US investigations and EU diplomatic pressure, a number of developing countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Taiwan and others have been forced to establish or enhance their IPRs.
Whilst there is a substantial debate related to the optimization of patent systems in the developed world (Maskus [1] ; Merrill et al [2] ; Pugatch [3] ), there is limited debate related to the approaches used in developing countries such as South Africa.
The objective of this article is to assess the extent to which patent protection rights in South Africa (nonexamining approach) assist or hinder the objectives of economic development.
II. PATENTS -A DIFFICULT BALANCE
Traditionally, the legal scholars had by far the greatest influence in the field debating patent and case laws, regulatory practices etc. However, as IPRs moved to occupy a central role in the knowledge economy (the amount of licensing contracts backed on patents is higher than US$ 100 billion worldwide currently) other professions, and particularly economists, moved in the field.
The economic approach brings a different pespective in the debate related to patents. The legal approach addresses issues of fairness and of balance of rights, of the internal consistency of the system and of the consistency of the patent law with other bodies of legislation. The economic approach is utilitarian in nature in the sense that its main focus is on the costs and benefits accruing to society (or to a particular group in society) from the function of the IPR system. The economic approach does not see IPRs as a "natural right" of the inventor but as a "policy instrument" that governments should adopt in order to maximize the interests of society.
The primary theoretical objective of the IPR is to supplement market forces that, on their own, do not lead to desirable levels of research and development and innovation. Broadly speaking, in an environment lacking adequate IPRs inventors will not invent (or they will invent less than what it is optimal) as they will not receive any (or they will receive limited) benefits from it. To use an economic explanation, positive externalities are present and arise when property rights cannot be clearly assigned. Society benefits out of inventions but inventors' benefits may not be reflected in the prices charged for the goods and services provided by the invention, hence the invention activity is sub-optimal.
The benefits of the IPRs system arise from its dual mission i.e. to encourage invention and diffusion of technology. Its costs arise from its modus operandi, which is to restrict the use of invention/technology. The above rationale for patent protection -to increase the incentive to invent by conferring the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention in exchange for foregoing secrecy by publishing the invention and making the information available for others to build upon -is not cast in stone. There are theoretical reasons to question how substantial the incentive of patenting is and how broadly the incentive operates across industries.
For example, the cost of disclosing the details of one's innovation to competitors through patent publication may be greater than the gain from patenting (Horstmann et al [4] ) and hence the invention will not be disclosed. Similarly where innovation is cumulative, it matters how and to whom intellectual property rights are first allocated. Thus, where innovators are followers, increasing patent strength could increase or it could reduce the incentives to innovate (Gallini [5] ; Merges et al [6] ; O'Donoghue et al [7] ). In a similar way Heller [8] argues that innovation suffers from gridlock because too many people own pieces of one thing i.e. one innovation. Heller names the phenomenon 'tragedy of the anti-commons'.
Guellec et al [9] suggest that 'the system is more and more widely seen as feeding excesses, such as "patent trolling" (i.e. attorneys blackmailing operational businesses by threatening them with litigation over dubious patents) or "patent thickets" (i.e. the foreclosure of a market by erecting a dense web of patents)'. Obviously such activities act as deterrents to R&D and innovation.
Maskus [10] investigated how IPRs affect decisions related to foreign direct investments (FDI) -an important means of technology transfer to developing countries. He argued that there are information imperfections in the market for technology. This information imperfection implies that all things being equal, firms would be more likely to engage in FDI in countries with weaker IPRs and contract enforcement. An implication is that as IPRs in a particular nation become stronger, firms will tend to choose more technology licensing and joint ventures and less FDI. He suggests that 'this is the one identifiable theoretical case in which the strength of IPRs would be negatively associated with FDI flows. However, as FDI decisions are not based only on IPR considerations the conclusions are at best ambiguous'.
An important concern involves inventions that are useful solely or primarily for further research (Nelson [11] ). Previously, in most cases, these techniques and discoveries became part of the public domain of scientific knowledge. The tendencies and efforts to protect research methodologies obviously restrict further research and invention. The concern has focused primarily on the field of biotechnology.
On the empirical domain there is a growing body of research investigating the relationship between patents and innovation across countries and time. Lerner [12] and Moser [13] find that instituting a patent system or strengthening an existing patent system does not produce more domestic innovation, although the latter does induce inventors from other countries to patent more in the country making the change. It may also induce foreign multinationals to transfer more technology to affiliates in the country (Branstetter et al [14) .
A recent review of the National Research Council of the Academy of Sciences [15] in the USA states that 'one may legitimately question whether the impact of patenting on innovation and its consequences for social welfare are, on balance, positive outside of the handful of industries, such as pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, medical devices, and specialty chemicals where the benefits are well established, and possibly to a lesser extent, computers and auto parts'.
Empirical research investigating the relationship between IPR regimes and R&D efforts has also ambivalent findings due to, among others, the bidirectional relationship. Arora et al [16] find that patents have a positive impact on R&D expenditures in most industries and particularly in drugs. In the USA an increase in the patent premium (associated with a stronger patent regime) by 10% would generate an increase in business R&D by 6%. The estimated effect is higher in biotechnology and pharmaceuticals and lower in semiconductors and electronics. Similarly Kanwar and Evenson [17] investigate 29 OECD countries for the period 1981 to 1990. They find that the patents rights index has a positive and significant effect of R&D intensity (R&D per GDP).
On the other hand, Hall and Ziedonis [18] find that the stronger IPR regime related to semiconductor industry during the 1980's did not affect the R&D efforts of the industry.
It appears that Machlup's [19] statement of 50 years ago in the Subcommittee of Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights, of the Committee on the Judiciary -US Senate, is still relevant: 'no economist on the basis of present knowledge, could possibly state with certainty that the patent system, as it now operates, confers a net benefit or a net loss to society'.
III. IPR AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
IPRs have created particular debate in the context of economic development. The economic well-being of a nation or region is linked closely to the availability of know-how and technology. Technological progress is an important determinant of both productivity and income levels. IPR may affect domestic efforts to innovate and in the same time they may influence foreign direct investments, trade, technology transfer, costs of licensing, R&D and so on. If direct investments, economic growth, employment etc. can be influenced by the strength of IPRs in an economy, then governments may be able to exploit IPR policy in order to stimulate development.
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, [20, 21] ) produced a number of studies calling for the improvement of the ways in which patents and trade marks operate in the transfer of technology.
However the empirical literature is ambivalent on the subject. Lerner [22] studied significant changes in patent law in more than 70 countries over 150 years and correlates them with the number of patents granted in these countries. He found that strengthening patent rights generated in general an increase in patent filings from foreign assignees, but had no effect on filings by nationals.
Kearney [23] asked business leaders from the world's 1 000 largest firms to identify the most critical risks to their corporations as they invest abroad. At the top of the list were such issues as government regulations, country financial risk, risk of political and social disturbances (each of which cited by at least 60% of the respondents). Theft of IP was cited only by 17% of the respondents and was ranked 12 th in the list of concerns.
Lippoldt [24] reviewed the relevant literature examining the empirical linkage between national IP environments, international trade, foreign direct investments and licensing. He finds that overall stronger IPRs "tend" to boost trade, FDI and licensing in developing countries. However, he emphasizes that IP reforms alone will not bring the desirable effect. IPR will be beneficial provided that a number of preconditions exist (such as effective educational systems, appropriate regulation; environment conducive to enterprises and others).
These findings echo Maskus [25] conclusions that the optimum protection varies according to industry and level of development. He finds evidence that the strength of IPR rises endogenously with economic development. Low income countries may choose to reduce the strength and scope of their IPR as they acquire better abilities to imitate technical information and establish production facilities based on that imitation. Middle-income countries are found to have a growing interest in improving protection as their markets deepen and their capabilities to innovate become stronger. Protection accelerates rapidly at higher income levels. His major conclusion is that 'many developing countries are a long way from income levels that would encourage them to adopt stronger IPRs as a matter of course' and that the major short term impact of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement is a transfer of economic benefits from technology importing to technology exporting nations (with the largest gains accruing to the United States).
Chang [26] , like List [27] , argues that developed countries "kicked away the ladder" that they had climbed to reach the world's top economic position so that the developing countries cannot use it and that recent IPR changes make development a lot harder .
Switzerland, Canada, Spain and the Netherlands "borrowed" foreign technologies during their development.
Furthermore Chang argues that the recent changes in the IPR systems have magnified costs while reducing the benefits. This has made economic development more difficult. As 97% of all patents and other IPR instruments are held by rich countries, the strengthening of the rights of IPRholders means that acquiring knowledge is becoming more expensive for developing countries. The World Bank estimates that following the TRIPS agreement, the increase in technology license payments alone will cost developing countries an extra US $45 billion a year. This is approximately 50% of all total foreign aid provided by rich countries.
Chatterjee et al [28] reviewed 45 studies investigating the effects of IPR in developing nations. He suggests that the theoretical literature identifies that "In general, strengthening Southern IPR protection does not benefit the South and produces ambiguous results in the North."
The issue of the economic effects of the Australian patent system was addressed by the 1982 study of Mandeville, Lamberton and Bishop. They concluded that the 'economic benefits of the patent system to the innovative process in Australia are not only small, but extremely subtle'. They suggested that:
x 'The patent incentive is not an important determinant of measured domestic R&D activity but plays a small role for the small inventor.
x Patents apparently play a subtle role in connection with investment expectations and the transfer of technology to Australia.
x Patent information is a relatively unimportant source of R&D/technological information for domestic industry, small inventors and professional engineers. However, it is regarded as having some importance by large overseas-based multinational firms.
x The majority of patents held by domestic firms are said to produce a return but the absence of a patent system would be unlikely to affect production significantly.'
The study concluded that there was "little room for doubt that the benefit/cost ratio of the patent system in Australia is negative or at the very best in balance". However, these costs and benefits were considered to be outweighed by the negative economic effects to Australia's international commercial relations, should the system be abolished. South Africa is a non-examining country. This means that CIPRO does not investigate the novelty or inventive merit of the invention -only the forms or documentation are verified and not the substance of the product or process. CIPRO suggests that this is the result of lack of financial resources and scientific expertise. Currently most of the patent granting authorities internationally safeguard quality by examining the subject matter, utility, novelty and non-obviousness of the filed patents.
The South African approach has a number of adverse consequences. For example, the system may "allow" the granting of patents which fall in excluded categories; it may create social costs through monitoring of non-novel patents by the various stakeholders, it may create market power for particular patent holders, it may create obstacles for further research and development in certain technological fields etc. [29] ) on software and business method patents during January 2007 saying that "all Microsoft's patents had been filed (in South Africa) through government channels and were completely legal". Similarly, Novell has been quoted saying that they use a "proactive counter patenting" strategy in South Africa. In order to identify the possible share of frivolous patents registered at CIPRO we identified the number of applications and number of grants in a number of intellectual property offices around the world (Table I) . Table I shows that Australia and Canada grant less than 20% of the applications they receive. In China the relevant share is 5% and in New Zealand approximately 10%. Assuming that the South African conditions are similar to those in Australia and Canada, we can conclude that more than 80% of the current applications at CIPRO would have not be granted patents under an examining system. Obviously this creates a substantial cost to the economy as each company should monitor CIPRO duplicating "unproductive" activities.
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The issue of non-examination affects also the scope of patents i.e. breath and number of claims. Patent applicants may use drafting language in such as way as to create a smokescreen that aims to hide the actual boundaries of the invention and simultaneously increase the number of claims. Furthermore, such approaches pollute prior-art and increase the overall uncertainty. The EPO and USPTO set limits to the number of claims to be included in the same patent and set different fees for patents including more than certain number of claims. The South African approach hides the breath and number of claims contained in each patent. A consequence is that any statistics related to the number of local and international applicants are non comparable and are unreliable.
The registration approach makes the South African regime one of the cheapest in the World. South Africa is 20 to 30 times cheaper than the other patent regimes. This opens the system to frivolous and useless patents which increase uncertainty, increase search and monitoring costs by interested patentees and makes more difficult the dissemination of prior art by the useful/real inventions. Moreover the system creates an asymmetry disadvantaging SA inventors. Foreign inventors are able to protect their invention in South Africa very cheaply. South African inventors on the other hand, are usually unable to protect their inventions abroad due to high costs. In order to validate the argument that South Africans are disadvantaged in protecting their IP abroad we examined CIPRO's applications by university professors. University professors were chosen in order to maintain certain minimum standards in the applications. It is expected that universities aim to maintain certain standards from such applications and professors are expected to be under pressure from their peers not to apply for frivolous patents.
We identified that during the 1996-2006 period the country's universities and their academics have applied for 280 patents at CIPRO. Next we investigated whether those patents were protected abroad. We identified that only 58 of the 280 patents were protected abroad. Even though certain inventions may require only protection in the local market it can be argued that international protection of 20% of academic patents is relatively low.
An important issue related to modus operandi of CIPRO is the fact that it does not provide online search facilities for South African Patents. Consequently all searches are carried out by hand (if at all) at the Patent Office through a cardbased system. Although electronic patent searches may be performed on a contract basis on proprietary systems such as the Electronic Patent Journal the approach is not supportive of the requirements of the public interest to disseminate the know-how of patents widely.
In order to validate further the argument of opaqueness we examined a random sample of 71 patents awarded to South Africans by USPTO during the 1998-2002 period. These patents constitute a 10% sample of the patents awarded to South African's during the period. These patents were using 726 other patents as prior art. Sixty eight percent of An important characteristic of patent systems is their strength. Park et al [30] have developed an "Index of Patent Rights" (table II) For each of these categories a country is given a score ranging from 0 to 1 indicating the extent to which the country is strong in this aspect. We suggest that the strength of the South African index is an unintentional effect of the nonexamining approach. As we have argued, with appropriate drafting any idea can be protected by CIPRO (even when it is legally excluded), hence, for example, there are not exclusions. 
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V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this article we attempt to assess whether the patent system in South Africa assists in the objectives of development.
A review of recent literature indicates that there is growing evidence that the patent system does not bring the expected results and that in terms of economic development strong IPR may be a constraint for development. Hence, the argument has been developed that the rich countries "kicked away the ladder" that they have climbed to reach the world's top economic position so that the developing countries cannot use it.
Analysis of the South African patent regime identifies that South Africa is a non-examining country. Hence, granting patents for inventions that are not new or useful or that are obvious, unjustly reward the patent holder at the expense of real inventors, consumer and social welfare. A comparative assessment indicates that a substantial number of grants would not have been awarded under a different regime.
The issue of non-examination affects also the scope of patents i.e. breadth and number of claims. Patent applicants may use drafting language in such as way as to create a smokescreen that aims to hide the actual boundaries of the invention and simultaneously to increase the number of claims. Such approaches pollute the prior art and increase the overall uncertainty.
Finally the registration approach makes the South African regime one of the cheapest in the World. This opens the system to frivolous and useless patents which increase uncertainty, increase search and monitoring costs by interested patentees and makes more difficult the dissemination of prior art by the useful/real inventions. Furthermore the system creates an asymmetry favouring foreign inventors to protect their IPR . A sampling approach confirms the above argument.
Another issue related to modus operandi of CIPRO is the fact that no online search facilities exist for South African Patents.
It becomes apparent that the current regime not only does not support the national innovation system but it facilitates exploitation by foreign interests and creates substantial social costs. We suggest that a possible solution is the Turkish one. The Turkish Patent Office sends their applications to Russian, Danish, Swedish or European Patent Offices for novelty and examination search.
